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A Maternal Duty to Protect Fetal Health?
Recent cases indicate a trend toward recognizing a duty to protect fetal
health. Medical advances have precipitated the issue of whether such a duty
ought to be enforceable in a civil action against a pregnant woman. Although
a variety of medical techniques may be performed on the pregnant woman
to correct fetal anomalies, in order to utilize these medical advances some
cooperation by the pregnant woman is inherently necessary. All techniques
for treating the fetus during the pregnancy have some impact on the
mother, and her constitutional rights may be infringed if she is forced to
undergo treatment to benefit the fetus.
By canvassing some examples of prenatal treatment and by considering
cases in which courts have required the mother to undergo treatment
against her wishes to benefit the fetus, this note will examine whether there
should be a duty to protect fetal health. The mother's constitutional rights
will be limned and weighed against such a duty. Foreseeable problems in
enforcing this duty will be explored to explain why practical considerations
lead to the conclusion that enforcing a duty to protect fetal health by either
monetary or injunctive relief would be undesirable in many cases.
MEDICAL BACKGROUND
To be able to gauge the nature of the treatment the pregnant woman
might be asked to undergo to benefit the fetus, it is first necessary to lay
the groundwork by providing some medical background of the procedures
entailed, the benefits to the fetus, and the risks of foregoing treatment.
Recognized methods of preserving or improving fetal health vary in their
level of intrusiveness to the mother. Whether a court would be persuaded
to order a specific treatment may partially depend on its impact on the
mother. Some examples of possible prenatal treatment should suffice to
illustrate the range of intrusiveness of medical intervention.
Before beginning the discussion of specific forms of prenatal treatment,
it is appropriate to note that the risks involved in fetal diagnosis and treat-
ment are generally greater for the fetus than for the mother;1 however,
the risks vary with the magnitude and invasiveness of the procedure. Pro-
ceeding from most to least invasive, in utero surgery exemplifies the
greatest intrusion.
To illustrate, hydronephrosis, an obstruction of the ureter, has recently
been successfully treated by fetal surgery.2 In this case, the risks of direct
Harrison, Golbus & Filly, Management ofthe Fetus with a Correctable CongenitalDefect,
246 J.A.M.A. 774, 776 (1981).
2 Harrison, Golbus, Filly, Callen, Katz, deLorimier, Rosen & Jonsen, Fetal Surgery for
Congential Hydronephrosis, 306 NEw ENG. J. MED. 591 (1982).
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fetal surgery are numerous: mother or fetus might die; post-operative
bleeding or infection might cause an abortion or require reoperation; an
hysterectomy may be necessary; Caesarean section delivery would be
necessary for this child and any subsequent children; the fetus might have
other, undetected defects; the surgery might be unsuccessful; or the surgery
might not allow the fetus to survive after birth.' A mother carrying a fetus
with severe bilateral hydronephrosis must weigh the risks associated with
correction against the risks of neonatal death or severe disability from renal
or pulmonary failure.4
Further examples of treatable fetal anomalies involving invasive pro-
cedures include hydrocephaly, an accumulation of fluid in the brain which
may be treated by fluid extraction before birth.' This anomaly occurs in
approximately one of 2,000 fetuses,' and increases the risk of fetal mor-
bidity, as well as complicating vaginal delivery.7 If untreated, fetal cerebral
growth will be retarded.8 However, hydrocephaly may be alleviated by in-
serting a shunt.' The treatment entails insertion of a needle guided by ultra-
sound imagery through the maternal abdomen into the fetus." This pro-
cedure is repeated six times over a seven week period."
Erythroblastosis, incompatibility between maternal and fetal Rh factor,
is treatable via intrauterine transfusions.1 2 This condition occurs in very
few pregnancies.13 If untreated, fetal and infant symptoms include sub-
cutaneous edema, jaundice, skin lesions, heart enlargement, pulmonary
hemorrhage, and neurological disorders. 4 Alternatively, the fetus might
die in utero." Without treatment, the fetal mortality rate is thirty percent. 6
Expression of the disease is variant.
7
3 Id. The surgery itself would begin with anesthetization of both mother and fetus.
Sonography is used to determine the fetal position. An incision is then made into the mater-
nal abdomen through which the uterus may be opened and the lower fetal body removed.
The dilated ureters of the fetus are then opened and "marsupialized" to the skin. Twenty-
five minutes later, the fetus is returned to the uterus. The amniotic cavity must be irrigated
and the uterus closed to complete the procedure. The fetus must be delivered by Caesarean
section. Id.
Harrison, Golbus & Filly, supra note 1, at 777.
Burnholz & Frigoletto, Antenatal Treatment of Hydrocephalus, 304 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1021, 1021 (1981).
' J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, WILLIAM'S OBSTETRICS 822 (16th ed. 1980). This anomaly
accounts for roughly 12% of all severe malformations at birth. Id.
Burnholz & Frigoletto, supra note 5, at 1021.
Id. at 1022.
Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1021.
I d.
12 J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 6, at 970.
11 Id. at 962-63.
" I& at 966-70.
" Id- at 968.
16 Id. at 965.
' Id- at 966. Maternal antibodies cross into the fetal circulatory system. Absorbed an-
tibodies accelerate the destruction of fetal red blood cells; the sooner this process begins
and the greater its intensity, the more severe is the effect on the fetus. Id.
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With aggessive management, however, the fetal mortality rate is reduced
to ten percent. Aggressive management involves diagnostic amniocentesis,
intrauterine transfusions in some cases, and early delivery in most cases.18
Transfusions are accomplished by first administering a local anesthetic to
the fetal abdomen by injection into the amniotic cavity. A local anesthetic
is also administered to the mother. A catheter is then inserted through
which the fetus may be transfused in utero. This process is repeated at
two to three week intervals, beginning between the twenty-fourth and
thirtieth weeks of gestation and lasting until delivery.19 Delivery is best
accomplished by Caesarean section at thirty-four weeks gestation."
Other conditions may be treated by drug therapy. For instance, fetal red
blood cell deficiency may be treated by injecting red blood cells into the
fetal peritoneal cavity.2 Likewise, congenital hypothyroidism, which might
lead to cretinism if untreated,' may be treated by injecting intraamniotic
thyroid hormone into the amniotic fluid.' Intrauterine growth retardation
may be corrected by instilling nutrients into the amniotic fluid to orally
feed the fetus.24
Other fetal diseases may be treated indirectly by administering drugs
to the mother. For example, respiratory distress syndrome may be
alleviated by administering glucocorticoids to the mother. This treatment
increases otherwise deficient pulmonary surfactant," alleviating the
disease.Y
Fetal hydrops, an accumulation of fluid throughout the body of the fetus,'
may be treated by administering diuretics and digitalis along with red blood
cells into the fetal peritoneal cavity.' A fetus with vitamin B12-responsive
methylmalonic acidemia may be treated by giving massive doses of vitamin
B1 2 to the mother,0 and a fetal biotin-dependent multiple carboxylase
deficiency3' may be treated by giving the mother pharmacologic doses of
biotin during the last half of her pregnancy.32
The imposition of dietary restrictions involves the same level of in-
" Id. at 965.
"9 J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, WILLIAM'S OBSTETRICS 809-10 (15th ed. 1976).
" J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 6, at 971.
21 Harrison, Golbus & Filly, supra note 1, at 775.
2 Id.
2 Id.
Id. at 775-76.
' Id. at 775.
Id. Pulmonary surfactant is a surface-active agent on the lungs. See DORLAND'S IL-
LUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1473 (24th ed. 1965).
Harrison, Golbus & Filly, supra note 1 at 775.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 664 (23d ed. 1976).
Harrison, Golbus & Filly, supra note 1 at 775.
SId.
S, Biotin is part of the vitamin B complex and is identical with vitamin H. See DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 199 (24th ed. 1965). Carboxylase is an enzyme which
facilitates the removal of C0 2 from the carboxyl group of alpha keto acids. Id. at 251.
1 Harrison, Golbus & Filly, supra note 1 at 775.
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trusiveness as drug therapy. Mothers of fetuses with specific biochemical
genetic errors may benefit their babies by following a special diet during
pregnancy. One such biochemical genetic error is phenylketonuria (PKU).M
Mothers of fetuses with PKU should follow a low phenylalanine diet to
minimize the incidence of metal retardation in their children.'
Restrictions of maternal conduct are equally intrusive, albeit in a less
direct, physical sense than are bodily invasions. Alcohol consumption and
smoking are two activities upon which restrictions might be imposed. Mater-
nal alcohol abuse has been linked to multiple congenital abnormalities, in-
cluding heart defects and prenatal growth retardation. 5 Children of
alcoholic mothers risk higher perinatal mortality, lower birthweight, and
fetal alcohol syndrome.3 6 The -symptoms of fetal alcohol syndrome include
prenatal and postnatal growth deficiency, eye and ear anomalies, heart
defects, and varied degrees of mental retardationY The incidence of fetal
alcohol syndrome in the United States is one in 750 births.' Maternal smok-
ing increases the risks of prematurity and abortion.-'
In considering whether a duty to protect fetal health ought to be imposed,
one should bear in mind that the nature of the remedy a court might order
could take any of these forms. Remedies would vary on an individual basis,
subject to the needs of the fetus in each case. The complexity injected by
myriad possible forms of relief would not easily allow courts to classify ap-
propriate instances for relief using a general rule. Additionally, the technical
nature of the problems and remedies, combined with the variability of the
cases, would make any litigation complicated, protracted, and expensive.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
Cases Imposing a Duty to Protect Fetal Health
The courts do not seem concerned by the unavailability of a general rule
PKU is a congenital deficiency of phenylalanine hydroxylase which causes metabolic
errors. Brain damage results. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 28, at 1072.
Waisman, Role of Hyperphenylalaninemia in Pregnant Women as a Cause ofMental Retar-
dation in Offspring, 99 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNEC. 431 (1967). The prescribed diet is quite restric-
tive and unpalatable. See infra text accompanying note 104. Little protein is allowed in any
form. W. WADLINGTON, J. WALTZ & R. DWORKIN. LAW AND MEDICINE 859-60 (1980).
' Little and Streissguth, Effects ofAlcohol on the Fetus: Impact and Prevention, 125 CAN.
MED. A.J. 159,159 (1981). If alcohol intake by pregnant women who drink heavily is reduced,
the likelihood of having a normal infant increases. In contrast, only seven percent of the women
who drink heavily during pregnancy may expect to deliver normal babies. "Heavily" is defined
as 174 ml of absolute alcohol per day. (This equals about 5.9 oz..) Quellette, Rosett, Rosman
& Weiner, Adverse Effects on Offspring of Maternal Alcohol Abuse During Pregnancy, 297 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 528, 528-30 (1977).
' Little and Streissguth, supra note 35 at 159.
3 Id.
Id. at 162.
H. TUCHMANN-DUPLESSIS. DRUG EFFECTS ON THE FETUS 183 (1975).
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for allowing recovery. Three recent cases suggest a trend toward recogniz-
ing a duty to protect fetal health. In Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County
Hospital,"0 a woman had placenta previa41 which created a fifty percent risk
of maternal death and a ninety-nine percent risk of fetal death if the baby
were delivered vaginally. 2 The Georgia Supreme Court authorized the
hospital to perform a Caesarean section on the woman against her objec-
tion on religious grounds to save the life of her unborn child. 3 The per
curiam opinion began by noting the risks of vaginal delivery to both mother
and fetus." The proposed method of delivery had a ninety-nine percent
chance of allowing both mother and fetus to live." The court mentioned
that an abortion this late in the pregnancy would constitute a criminal of-
fense in Georgia. 6 Remarkably, the court proceeded without elaboration
from these statements to its holding that the intrusion to the mother was
warranted by the fetus's right to be born alive. 7
A New Jersey court also has ordered medical treatment of a pregnant
woman against her wishes when necessary to protect the life of her un-
born child. In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson,'49
the New Jersey Supreme Court authorized blood transfusions if necessary
to save the life of either the pregnant woman or the unborn child. As in
Jefferson, the fetus was viable5' and the woman's objection to treatment
was based on religious grounds. ' Also as in Jefferson, the court noted the
risks to both mother and fetus of foregoing treatment.2 The New Jersey
court based its order on prior decisions ' which allowed blood transfusions
for an infant contrary to the parents' wishes' and recognized a cause of
action for prenatal injury. 5
A recent holding by the Michigan Court of Appeals went beyond those
of the Georgia and New Jersey courts, recognizing a fetal right to be born
healthy rather than merely to be born alive. In Grodin v. Grodin58 the
247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
', Placenta previa describes a placenta which develops in the lower uterine section, blocking
the internal opening. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1165 (24th ed. 1965).
247 Ga. at 86, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
Id. at 87, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
44 Id. at 86, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
45 Id:
"Id. at 87, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
"Id. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
, Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
,9 Id.
I Id. at 422, 201 A.2d at 537.
5, Id. at 422, 201 A.2d at 537-38.
5' Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
w Id.
5 State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962) (state's interest in infant's welfare
justified ordering blood transfusion over parents' religious objection).
0 Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960) (child has cause of action for negligent
prenatal injury).
5 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
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Michigan court indicated a woman would be liable to her child for taking
tetracycline while pregnant if her conduct was held to be unreasonable.
Ingestion of the drug during her pregnancy caused her son's teeth to be
discolored. This court explained its holding by noting that the Michigan
Supreme Court decision in Womack v. Buckhorn,7 which allowed a child
to sue for negligent infliction of prenatal injury, did "not limit those who
may be held liable.""8 Consequently, according to the appellate court, the
child's mother would bear the same liability as a third person.59
The obvious similarity in all three opinions is their lack of analysis. The
courts failed to explain why decisions to allow infringement of the mother's
rights and to hold the mother liable followed from the stated premises. It
is conceivable that the state's power to prohibit abortion of viable fetuses,
the abrogation of intrafamilial tort immunity, the recognition of a cause
of action for negligent infliction of prenatal injury, and/or the parens patriae
power of the state to order medical treatment for children against the
wishes of the parents justify the decisions. While any or all of these legal
developments may logically pave the way for courts to impose a duty to
protect fetal health, such a result is not mandated.
Rights Versus Duty
Courts could analyze the issue of whether to impose a maternal duty to
protect fetal health by applying a balancing test which weighs the constitu-
tional rights of the mother against the implications of imposing such a du-
ty in each case."' The mother's rights to refuse medical treatment, to prac-
tice a religion, and to exercise parental discretion may all be subject to
invasion if there is a duty to protect fetal health. These rights can be ex-
trapolated from existing cases" as easily as can the duty to protect fetal
health, and sound arguments can be made regarding the importance of each,
thus creating a conflict.
In Jefferson, Anderson, and Grodin, the mother's constitutional right to
refuse medical treatment conflicted with the duty to protect fetal health.
The mother's right to refuse medical treatment is derived from the right
of privacy. In Andrews v. Ballard,62 a Texas district court stated that the
constitutional right of privacy protects personal and important decisions.
The decision to obtain or reject medical treatment was held to meet this
criterion.63 State courts have also declared that the constitutional right of
384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971).
102 Mich. App. at 400, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
59 Id-
See generally Note, Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in Prenatal Care,
67 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1981).
"1 See infra text accompanying notes 62, 64 and 72.
498 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Tex. 1980).
Id. at 104647.
[Vol. 58:531
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privacy encompasses the right to refuse medical treatment. 4 The right of
privacy, however, is not absolute. In Roe v. Wade," the United States
Supreme Court held that the right of privacy was subject to infringement
when a compelling state interest could be shown and when infringement
involved the least intrusive means.' The Court held that the state's interest
in the life of the fetus becomes compelling at the point of viability."' Thus,
in the abortion context, prior to viability, the pregnant woman's constitu-
tional right of privacy, encompassing the right to refuse medical treatment,
may not be infringed by the state. 8
However, infringement for other reasons, such as to protect maternal
health, is permitted regardless of viability. 9 While viability is the compel-
ling point in the abortion context, it is not necessarily the compelling point
as to the entire right of privacy. Interests that would place abortion within
the right of privacy are different from interests that would place the refusal
of care within the right of privacy; the former involves an interest in pro-
creative choices, while the latter may involve interests in personal integrity
or the right to die. Thus, different state interests may suffice to allow in-
fringement of the right of privacy in each instance. Viability is not the only
recognized ground for infringing the right of privacy."
The woman's right to refuse medical treatment may be subject to in-
fringement if she has young children, since the state has an important in-
terest in insuring that she lives to care for them. At least one court has
postulated that this interest may be sufficient to override the wishes of
a competent woman to forego medical treatment. 1
The woman's constitutional right to practice a religion may also be sub-
ject to circumscription to protect the fetus. In Jefferson and Anderson, the
mother's constitutional right to practice her religion was infringed to allow
the fetus to be born healthy. In Reynolds v. United States,7 the Supreme
Court held that the law may not interfere with religious beliefs, but may
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Superintendent of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,739,370 N.E.2d 417,424 (1977), stated that the constitutional right
of privacy protects against unwarranted infringements of bodily integrity. In In re Quinlan
70 N.J. 10, 4142, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Gorger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1976), the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that a once competent patient's
right to refuse medical treatment could be asserted on her behalf by her father to preserve
her constitutional right of privacy. Both of these cases involved the issue whether one has
the right to die.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See id. at 155.
Id. at 163.
But see infra text accompanying notes 110, 111 and 112.
6 See infra text accompanying note 71.
' See, e.g., Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 264-65, 399 N.E.2d 452,
457-58 (1979) (right to die implicit in the right of privacy may be overcome by state's interest
in maintaining prison discipline). See also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
7" Matter of Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 975, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (1976).
72 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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regulate religious practices." In Sherbert v. Verner,74 such regulation was
held to be justified only by a compelling state interest.75 The regulation
must also be accomplished by the least restrictive means."' The Supreme
Court has outlined a two step analysis to determine whether a given in-
fringement is permissible.77 The first step is to determine whether the claim
is deeply rooted in religious belief;78 the second step is to weigh the state's
interest. 9 Neither the Jefferson nor the Anderson court questioned the
validity of the woman's belief. As noted above, the state's interest in the
life of the unborn child would not be compelling until viability.
A third constitutional right of the mother, the right to exercise parental
discretion, was also restricted in Anderson and Grodin. In Anderson, if the
mother intended to have her child follow the tenets of her religion, the
ordered transfusions would impair her exercise of parental discretion. In
Grodin, the woman's decision to take tetracycline during her pregnancy
was arguably an exercise of parental discretion. The parental right to rear
childrens' was held to be a "sacred" interest in Prince v. Massachusetts.2
In a different context, the Supreme Court recently upheld this view.' The
relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected and the
due process clause protects free choice in family matters.' However, this
right is not absolute. As is true of the constitutional rights to refuse medical
treatment and to practice a religion, the right to exercise parental discre-
tion may be infringed if a compelling state interest exits.85 Restriction of
this right may be justified if a minor child's health is at stake,88 but the
state's interest in protecting fetal life does not become compelling until
viability.
" Id. at 166.
" 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
" Id. at 403.
" Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981). This case reaffirmed Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
78 Id. at 215. A personal preference will not suffice; the claim must be a "deep religious
conviction" which is "shared by an organized group." Id. at 216.
Id. at 221.
o If the court were to find she was unaware she was pregnant when she took the drug,
then taking tetracycline would not be an exercise of parental discretion.
" This right may differ in the prenatal context because the privacy right of the mother
will necessarily also be affected by the decisions made regarding the fetus.
321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
In Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), the Supreme Court held that parents "retain
plenary authority to seek such care [commitment to a mental institution] for their children,
subject to a physician's independent examination and medical judgment." Id. at 604. The Court
declared that the presumption that parents will act in their child's best interest applies to
support the parent's dominant decision-making role. Id.
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247, 1249 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
See In reRoger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921,928,569 P.2d 1286,1290,141 Cal. Rptr. 298,302 (1977)
(civil commitment of minor), and Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1980)
(court ordered chemotherapy treatment for child with leukemia against parents' wishes). See
[Vol. 58:531
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The propriety of an intrusion into the constitutional rights of a mother
depends not only upon whether there are compelling state interests, but
also upon whether there is some duty to protect fetal health. No constitu-
tional precedent establishes such a duty, although some cases suggest a
compelling state interest from which this result may be derived. Cases such
as Jefferson and Anderson recognize the duty to allow a viable fetus to be
born alive. Although these cases indicate a trend toward imposing some
duty to protect fetal health, they do not indicate how far this duty should
extend. The next logical extension that courts could make from the state's
interest in protecting the life of a viable fetus,87 however, is that once the
fetus is viable, the mother has a duty to allow it to be born healthy.
Arguably, the court in Grodin accepted this extension by allowing the trial
court to hold a mother responsible for negligently impairing fetal health."
Roe and its progeny also may be read as supporting such an extension. A
woman may seek an abortion only prior to viability, and then only under
certain conditions. Once the fetus is viable, the mother is restricted from
seeking an abortion. Since the mother would not be free to abort, it is
arguable that she should not be free to disregard fetal anomalies or injure
the fetus.
In order to evaluate whether such a duty should be imposed, this note
will consider the duty as if it were already established. Drawing
hypothetical parameters for a duty to protect fetal health is thus facilitated.
Once limited, the implications of imposing this duty may be explored.
Viability as a Criterion
Foreseeable problems arise if the duty to protect fetal health is con-
tingent on viability. As a matter of medical fact, the organogenetic period,
from day 13 to day 60, is the time of greatest sensitivity for the embryo.89
This is prior to viability. Teratogens are likely to cause major morphological
abnormalities at this stage in the pregnancy; in the third trimester the fetus
is less sensitive to teratogenic influences.90 As an example, as early as the
third week of gestation the embryo reaches a critical period of susceptibility
to abnormalities of the heart and central nervous system. 1 Between the
fourth and fifth weeks of gestation, the embryonic eyes and limbs undergo
a critical period of development.' By the eighth week, sensitivity of these
also, Matter of Daniel A.D., 106 Misc. 2d 370, 375-76, 431 N.Y.S.2d 936, 940 (1980) (termina-
tion of parental rights due to parents' mental illness).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Grodin, 102 Mich. App. at 870-71.
K. MOORE, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN-CLINICALLY ORIENTED EMBRYOLOGY 116 (1973).
! d.
o' Id. at 117 (see accompanying chart).92 Id.
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developing structures is lessened.9 Consequently, reliance on viability as
a criterion for recovery would disallow recovery for most injuries, including
the most severe injuries. In other contexts, courts have recognized the in-
justice of applying viability as a prerequisite to recovery for the negligent
infliction of prenatal injury. Viability was rejected in 1953 by the New York
court in Kelly v. Gregory;94 other jurisdictions have followed New York's
lead.95 Thus, if viability were essential to impose the duty to protect fetal
health, the result would be both unsound and inconsistent with stare decisis.
Another consideration militates against conditioning a duty to protect
fetal health on viability. As medical technology improves, the point at which
viability occurs becomes increasingly early; even now the determination
of viability varies from pregnancy to pregnancy.' The duty to protect fetal
health would attach earlier in some cases than in others. Also, the duty
will attach earlier in all cases as medical skill and knowledge advance. The
viability criterion therefore serves to complicate the decision of whether
to allow recovery.
Nonetheless, conditioning the duty to protect fetal health on viability
would avoid certain undesirable results. Early in the pregnancy, when the
risk to the fetus is greatest, the woman may be unaware she is pregnant.
One consequence of ignoring whether the fetus is viable is that the mother
may be liable for behavior which occurred before she knew she was preg-
nant. This result could be avoided by setting a reasonableness standard
for liability. This standard, however, would negate liability for most injuries
and for the most severe injuries.
Imposing liability before viability may also encourage mothers to abort.
Roe allows women to seek an abortion without state interference in the
first trimester.97 If a court were to order a pregnant alcoholic not to drink,
she might opt to abort to avoid compliance. Thus, a failure to condition the
duty to protect fetal health on viability may not effectuate either the goal
of preserving potential life or insuring that the fetus remains healthy. If
a duty to protect fetal health is imposed, courts will be faced with the Hob-
son's choice of resting that duty on viability, in which event determining
viability will complicate the decision and the most meritorious claims will
be barred, or ignoring viability, in which event liability may be imposed
93 Id.
- 282 A.D. 542,125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953). This case involved an action by a child for prenatal
injuries sustained when the defendant's car hit the child's mother during the third month
of the pregnancy.
" Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 349, 357-58 n.67 (1971).
Gruenwald, Growth of the Human Fetus L Normal Growth and Its Variation, 97 AM. J.
OBSTET. GYNEC. 1112 (1966). The Supreme Court adverted to this in Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976).
410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
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for behavior which is not culpable and mothers may be encouraged to abort
to avoid compliance.
REMEDIES
Regardless of whether fetal viability is a prerequisite to a duty to pro-
tect fetal health, courts must grapple with enforcement difficulties. Both
monetary and injunctive relief would be possible. In Jefferson and Ander-
son, the courts ordered medical treatment of the pregnant woman to benefit
the fetus. In Grodin, monetary damages were sought by the father and son.
Monetary Damages
An objective in imposing the duty to protect fetal health is to improve
or preserve fetal well-being. This goal will not be met by awarding damages
after the injury is manifested, although general deterrence may be effected.
However, if a duty were imposed early in the pregnancy, before the woman
was aware she was pregnant, the threat of monetary damages would not
influence her conduct as she would be oblivious to the possibility of her
liability. Further, maternal behavior is not insured; loss distribution in cases
of non-business individual defendants is not achievable without insurance
coverage.
As to culpability, there is a wide range of behavior that might injure
the fetus and yet is not opprobrious. To illustrate, there is no level of radia-
tion exposure which does not increase the risk of leukemia to the unborn
child.98 Also, the embryo is more sensitive to radiation than is the fetus.99
Therefore, a woman whose employment involves exposure to radiation, such
as an x-ray technician, may, by her continued employment, increase the
risk of harm to her unborn child early in the pregnancy, before she knows
she is pregnant. Yet, it may be necessary for her to work to support herself
and her future child, and she may have intended to go on leave once she
determined she was pregnant. It seems unfair to impose monetary damages
in such a case because of the lack of culpability. Further, there is a possibility
that the mother will suffer guilt, occasioned by her unwitting causation
of any resultant injury to the child; she should not also be forced to suffer
monetary damages.
At the other extreme, a woman may act with careless disregard for the
health of her unborn child by not following a proper diet during pregnancy,
even though it is possible for her to do so and although she realizes the
g Brent, Environmental Factors: Radiation in PREVENTION OF EMBRYONIC, FETAL, AND
PERINATAL DISEASE 185 (R. Brent & M. Harris ed. 1976).
0 Id
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resultant risk to her unborn child. This is a stronger case for monetary
relief than Grodin; in the latter case the woman allegedly took tetracycline
with the assurance of her physician that she could not possibly be
pregnant. 0 The Grodin court remanded for a determination of the
reasonableness of the mother's behavior.""
The standard of care necessary to avoid liability might be defined as that
of the "reasonably prudent expecting parent."'0 2 This standard would im-
pose a duty on the pregnant woman to realize the limits of her knowledge."
For imposition of the maternal duty to effect general deterrence, mothers
would need to know what sort of behavior might endanger the fetus in order
to avoid endangering fetal health. At a minimum, prenatal care and counsel-
ing would be necessary. Mothers might need to consult a physician to in-
sure optimal fetal health. If the mother were to negligently choose a
negligent physician, both might be liable for any resultant fetal injury.
Allowing fetal recovery for breaches of this duty might benefit someone
other than the fetus. Should the child die, the mother, as the beneficiary
of the child's estate, would be the real beneficiary of the damage award
assessed against her. In this event, monetary damages would be worse than
ineffective.
Injunctive Relief
Injunctive relief would be more appropriate than monetary damages
because the injury to the fetus could thus be mitigated or averted. However,
major drawbacks exist to affording injunctive relief. Enforcement dif-
ficulties are foreseeable. For instance, the imposition of dietary restrictions
on pregnant women would be difficult to monitor for compliance. The diet
prescribed for PKU mothers requires both abstinence from eating sources
of protein and consumption of Lofenalac,'" an unpalatable therapeutic agent.
The combination of the extraordinary restrictiveness of the diet and the
disagreeable taste of Lofenalac would provide a strong incentive not to com-
ply with a court order to follow the PKU diet. Consequently, hospitalizing
the woman, or otherwise insuring that her food intake would be strictly
controlled, would be necessary to enforce the dietary restriction. A similar
problem would arise if drugs were prescribed or proscribed. In utero
surgery might be the easiest treatment to compel; however, it is also the
most invasive.
10 Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 398, 301 N.W.2d 869, 869 (1980).
101 Id. at 402, 301 N.W.2d at 871.
102 Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 47 (1978).
10 See generally, Conner v. Winton, 8 Ind. 315 (1856) and Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass.
165 (1884). Both cases involved the duty of knowledge imposed on lay people giving medical
treatment.
10 Swayze, Phenylketonuria: A Case Study in Biochemical Legislation, 48 U. DET. J. URn.
L. 883, 899 (1971).
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Enforcement difficulties aside, injunctive relief, although more timely
than monetary damages, still may come too late. The critical development
period occurs early in gestation, when the woman may not realize she is
pregnant. Others who might initiate a lawsuit may similarly be unaware
of the danger to fetal health created by maternal behavior. As noted above,
an injunctive order issued early in the pregnancy may also encourage
abortion.
The Right to Injure
By withholding injunctive relief prior to viability, courts would impliedly
create a right to injure the fetus as a corollary of the right to seek an abor-
tion. The creation of such a right would raise an intuitive dilemma analogous
to that created by the issue of damages in the wrongful life context.
Wrongful life actions involve a claim by a child that he or she would have
been better off not born. The child in such cases seeks damages to compen-
sate for the injury of being born. The claim requires consideration of
whether death or no life at all would be preferable to a life of suffering.
The same question is posed in considering the right of the mother to ex-
pose the fetus to danger as a corollary of the right to seek an abortion.
If death would be preferable, the former right should not follow from the
latter. Endangering fetal health would thus constitute a greater harm than
abortion. One court has adopted this view. In Curlender v. Bio-Science
Laboratories,"' a California court found no policy reasons against holding
parents liable for the failure to abort when they knew that the child would
be born with congenital anomalies."'8
The California court thought the issue was one of proximate cause. If
the parents knew a seriously impaired infant would be born, and still elected
to proceed with the pregnancy, their choice would be an intervening act,
precluding other defendants' liability.1" By imposing liability on the parents,
the court would provide a powerful disincentive to continue the pregnancy
if the fetus would be born with congenital anomalies.
Although the court did not discuss this, it may have been concerned about
who would bear the burden attendant to the birth of a defective child. The
monetary cost of treating and caring for seriously impaired children can
be substantial. If parents were immune from liability and negligence was
not attributable to any other defendant, the state might bear the cost of
the child's care. A related concern was reflected in Buck v. Bell.""8 In that
105 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
' Id. at 829,165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. However, the California legislature, in apparent response
to this case, passed a statute relieving parents of liability in such a situation. CAL. CIV. CODE
S 43.6 (West 1982).1 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
OS 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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case, the United States Supreme Court sustained a law for the steriliza-
tion of institutionalized mental defectives. The purpose of the statute was
to preclude any further drain on the economy by future generations of men-
tal incompetents whose parents were likewise supported by the state. The
Supreme Court cited Buck with approval as recently as 1973.09
After Roe, the constitutional right of privacy, which encompasses
procreation,110 may only be infringed when there is evidence of a compell-
ing state interest. Thus, if Buck remains good law,"' the state has a com-
pelling interest in the birth of healthy children. If so, the right to injure
the fetus would not follow from the right to seek an abortion. As long as
the pregnancy continued, the pregnant woman would not be free to injure
the fetus, although prior to viability she would be free to seek an abortion.
However, in Buck the plaintiff was institutionalized, a ward of the state.
Some parents might be able to pay the cost of raising impaired children.
If the parents were to bear this burden, the monetary cost to the state
would be lessened, as would the state's interest in insuring the child would
be born healthy. This lesser interest might be insufficient to justify in-
fringing the woman's right of privacy.
Initiation of Litigation
Before the mother may be held liable to the fetus, someone must initiate
litigation. The group of persons most likely to be cognizant of the risk to
the fetus would be the mother, her physician, and others close to her.
Clearly, the mother would not initiate a lawsuit. Requiring that a physi-
cian do so would be unwise. The threat of a lawsuit by a physician might
discourage women from seeking prenatal care or fully confiding in their
doctors; this limited access to information might impair the doctors' abil-
ity to provide the best patient care. In a different context, the California
Supreme Court in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of Californiau' disagreed.
That court held that a psychotherapist has a duty to take reasonable steps
to warn endangered potential victims if his patient threatens to harm
them.' Of the factors to be weighed in the decision to impose the duty,
foreseeability of the risk was weighted most heavily. 4 Reliance on
I" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
""o See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
" For the conclusion that it is not good law, see Comment, Eugenic Sterilization Statutes:
A Constitutional Re-evaluation, 14 J. FAM. L. 280 (1975). The author suggests that if the case
arose today, "increased legal sensitivity to fundamental human rights" would require a dif-
ferent outcome. Id. at 297. The same view was expressed by the New Jersey court in In re
Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 246, 426 A.2d 467, 472 (1981).
1"2 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). The context of this case was quite
different; it involved a psychotherapist whose patient told him he would kill someone and
later did. The psychotherapist failed to warn the victim.
113 Id. at 439, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
I" Id. at 435, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
[Vol. 58:531
MATERNAL DUTY
foreseeability prior to fetal viability would place doctors in the awkward
position of determining whether the patient would elect to abort in the face
of a court order enjoining or mandating behavior to protect the fetus. If
the patient would choose to abort, the doctor would have to decide whether
abortion or the risk to fetal health would be the greater harm. Also, if
Tarasoff was wrongly decided, only the patient would be injured by his
or her failure to fully confide in the physician. If the patient were preg-
nant, both she and the fetus would receive less than optimal care. For these
reasons, the Tarasoff holding is unpersuasive in this context.
Relying on others beside the doctor to sue would not be efficacious. They
may be unaware of the pregnancy until it is too late, and they may lack
the requisite medical knowledge to be aware of any danger to the fetus.
CONCLUSION
Medical advances have precipitated the issue of whether a duty to pro-
tect fetal health ought to be imposed on pregnant women. In utero surgery,
drug therapy, and diet are available means of prenatal treatment. To in-
sure fetal well-being, courts might choose any of these ways to minister
to the fetus. All involve exerting control over the mother, although the
level of intrusiveness varies.
In three recent cases courts have infringed upon the rights of the mother
in order to protect the fetus. Unfortunately, cogent analysis was missing
from all three opinions. One hypothetical method of analysis is to weigh
the constitutional rights of the mother against the duty to the fetus in each
instance. However, if fetal viability is a criterion, recovery will not be al-
lowed for most injuries or for the most severe injuries, and the decision
whether to permit recovery will be complicated. Conversely, if viability
is ignored, liability may be imposed for behavior which is not culpable, and
mothers may be encouraged to abort.
Regardless of whether fetal viability is a prerequisite to recovery, en-
forcement of a duty to protect fetal health would be difficult at best.
Monetary relief would not be timely and may not effect general deterrence.
Additionally, loss distribution is not now possible, and monetary damages
may only compound the grief attendant to the birth of a child with con-
genital anomalies. Problems also exist if a duty to act reasonably is to be
imposed on pregnant women. In some cases, the mother may be the true
beneficiary of the damage award.
Other problems impede the effectiveness of injunctive relief. Compliance
may be difficult to monitor. Also, no one may know of the risk of harm un-
til too late to prevent its occurrence. An injunctive order early in the preg-
nancy may encourage abortion.
If the duty to protect fetal health only attaches after viability, courts
may impliedly give women the right to injure the fetus as a corollary of
the right to seek an abortion. The extent of the state's interest in the birth
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of healthy children is unclear and may be insufficient to limit this right.
Policy dictates that physicians should not be the ones to initiate lawsuits
to enforce the duty to protect fetal health. Yet, others may lack knowledge
of the pregnancy or the medical facts and therefore be unable to do so.
In light of the dearth of analysis offered by the courts which have im-
posed a duty to provide an optimal in utero environment, the implications
of protecting fetal health militate against imposition of such a duty without
attention to the problems of enforcement and fairness in imposing liabil-
ity. The blanket adoption of a duty to protect fetal health would otherwise
not adequately protect the fetus. Although constitutionally permissible and
logically acceptable in the abstract, practical considerations require that
courts deny absolute enforcement of a duty to protect fetal health. In those
cases in which the imposition of such a duty is warranted, the courts should
clarify the process by which the decision to impose a duty was reached.
Following a conventional tort analysis, the courts should weigh the relative
intrusion to the mother and any medical risks to her against the benefits
to the fetus, including the likelihood of success. The successfulness of the
remedy will depend on the courts' ability to monitor and compel compliance;
this factor should also be weighed. In cases where the intrusion is slight
and the potential benefit to the fetus significant, if there is a substantial
probability of compliance with the court's order, injunctive relief should
issue as required to protect fetal health. These decisions would necessar-
ily be made on a case-by-case basis.
Case-by-case adjudication is preferable because any uniform rule would
either ineffectively protect fetal health or effectively emasculate the
mother's right of privacy. To avoid these harsh extremes, each case should
be decided on its particular facts. Some consistency should be achieved if
the above factors are clearly balanced in each instance.
SUSAN R. WEINBERG
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